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Communism and Memory Politics in the European Union 
David Clarke, University of Bath UK 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article assesses the potential for memory of communism to become part of the EU’s memory 
culture by comparing three contrasting case studies: the Baltic States, Hungary and Germany. It 
argues that, rather than the emergence of a western European memory culture which is challenged 
by a uniform eastern memory culture within the EU, as some commentators have claimed, the 
different positions of EU member states tend to be conditioned by a range of domestic and 
international factors. In terms of the promotion of the memory of communism within the EU, these 
factors can vary significantly from state to state, demonstrating the continued dominance of the 
national frame in the mobilisation of historical memory. 
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As Bo Stråth has observed, the project of European unification since the Cold War has increasingly 
been concerned with issues of identity.1 The attempt to define a common historical memory has 
been central to these debates, with the National Socialist genocide against Europe’s Jews playing a 
key role in the European Union’s memory politics. With the expansion of the EU to former 
communist countries, however, these new member states have pressed for the inclusion of the 
memory of communist dictatorship in a common European memory, under the umbrella of an ‘anti-
totalitarian’ memory which condemns both fascism and Stalinism alike. 
 
                                            
1Bo Stråth, ‘A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of a Concept’, European Journal of Social Theory, 5.4 
(2002), 387-401 (p. 388). 
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This activism on the part of European politicians from post-communist member states, and by the 
national governments of those states, will be examined in detail below. It raises two important 
questions for understanding the memory politics of the European Union today. Firstly, it is 
necessary to understand what motivates such activism. Secondly, it is important to assess the extent 
to which these states’ promotion of an ‘anti-totalitarian’ memory politics in the EU is likely to 
succeed given the well-established pre-dominance of remembrance of National Socialism and the 
Holocaust as points of moral orientation for the Union and its members. As I will demonstrate 
below, these two questions are in fact very much interconnected, in that the particular motivations 
of the post-communist member states to insist upon the parity of memories reveals not just 
divergent historical experiences which militate against consensus on a shared history, but also 
concrete national interests and nation-specific domestic political struggles which inform the option 
for one version of history or another. Therefore, although post-communist member states 
increasingly appeal to the European level to promote commemoration of communist crimes, I will 
argue that their reasons for doing so remain rooted in the national context. This will be 
demonstrated with regard to case studies of the Baltic states and Hungary, which will be contrasted 
with the case of Germany as one of the core western European member states, in order to 
demonstrate how differing national interests and domestic political situations shape individual 
states’ readiness to accept ‘anti-totalitarian’ memory as opposed to the established European 
memory of the Holocaust. These three cases studies are chosen for their diversity, in order to 
demonstrate how conditions at the national level motivate different responses to a supposedly 
shared European past. 
 
In examining such national interests and taking into account internal political divisions, I will offer 
a more complex picture of the search for a place for communism in European memory than has 
hitherto been considered. Previous analyses have tended to assume that a common front of post-
communist member states promoting memory of communism at the EU level indicates a common 
3 
 
set of motivations. For example, both Carlos Closa Montero2 and Maria Mälksoo3 have understood 
this phenomenon in terms of a search for recognition within the EU on the part of  central and 
eastern European states, who feel themselves reduced to junior partners, required to take on the 
values of the pre-2004 member states as expressed in the latter’s view of history. Or, as Mälksoo 
puts it, the central and eastern European states are ‘rebelling against the Western European 
rendering of their own mnemonic culture as obligatory for all others’ and challenging ‘the long-term 
tendency of the old Western core of the EU to act as a model for the whole of Europe’.4 
Alternatively, voices from the Left and from Israel join together, for entirely different reasons, in 
regarding the promotion of memory of communism in the EU as an attempt to side-step an 
engagement with National Socialism. For example, writing in the Times of Israel in March 2012, 
the Director of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre, Jerusalem, Efraim Zuroff, has described the Prague 
Declaration (discussed below) and related initiatives as an attempt by eastern and central European 
nations to avoid dealing honestly ‘with their Holocaust crimes’, transforming themselves from 
‘perpetrator nations into countries of victims’.5 Writing from a communist perspective, on the other 
hand, British author Phil Katz sees attempts to commemorate human rights abuses in the Soviet 
bloc as a conspiracy of the Right to discredit socialist alternatives in the future, while at the same 
time diverting attention from the historical legacy of their own ideology.6 In a similar vein, French 
Left intellectual Régine Robin, in the context of a seminar series organised by Germany’s Rosa 
Luxemburg Foundation, describes what she sees as the EU’s support for the anti-communist agenda 
in central and eastern Europe as offering support to the whitewashing of many new member states’ 
previous complicity in fascism.7 While these motivations are undoubtedly present to some extent in 
debates around the commemoration of the communist past in central and eastern Europe, the 
                                            
2Carlos Closa Montero, ‘Politics of Memory: What is the Role for the EU?’, in Europe 70 Years after the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, ed. by European Parliament (Vilnius, 2009), pp. 111-31. 
3Maria Mälksoo, ‘The Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns and the Collective 
Memory of Europe’, European Journal of International Relations, 15 (2009), 653-680. 
4Ibid., p. 672.  
5Efraim Zuroff, ‘Why Joachim Gauck is Wrong for Germany’, Times of Israel, 22 March 2012. Available at: 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/why-joachim-gauck-is-wrong-for-germany/ (accessed 25 October 2012). 
6Phil Katz, Freedom From Tyranny: The Fight Against Fascism and the Falsification of History (London, 2010), p. 102. 
7Régine Robin, ‘Das Verschwinden der DDR im kollektiven Gedächtnis’, in Vom kritischen Gebrauch der Erinnerung, 
ed. by Thomas Flierl and Elfriede Müller (Berlin, 2009) pp. 49-66 (pp. 50-52). 
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approach of these commentators is essentially monocausal, failing to take into account nation-
specific differences which colour these engagements with history. These analyses seek a catch-all 
explanation for the promotion of memory of communism by post-2004 member states at the EU 
level, ignoring the significant variations in approaches to the past which, for example, Stefan 
Troebst has observed.8 Rather than pit a homogenous western European memory against a 
homogenous eastern European memory, I argue, close examination of individual case studies will 
help to show how, in terms of the motivations for promoting one form or another of European 
memory, the national frame still very much matters. 
 
The Development of European Memory Politics 
 
The potential foundations of a European identity attached specifically to the EU and its institutions 
are various and highly contested. While some argue for the power of citizenship rights in promoting 
a sense of identification with the EU, others point to the potential power of a presumed shared 
culture or even a shared religious heritage, as in the Vatican’s campaign to have Christianity 
incorporated into the failed EU constitution.9 Increasingly, however, it is history that the EU has 
identified as a potentially unifying factor: a trend evidenced, for example, by the European 
Parliament’s decision in 2008 to fund a museum called the House of European History in Brussels, 
to open in 2014. As Claus Leggewie points out, the actual contents of the museum remain shrouded 
in a certain amount of mystery.10 However, a sceptical British newspaper report notes that the likely 
                                            
8Stefan Troebst, ‘Jalta versus Stalingrad, GULag versus Holocaust: Konfligierende Erinnerungskulturen im größeren 
Europa’, Berliner Journal für Soziologie. 15.3 (2005), 381-400. 
9For an overview of these debates, see Martin Kohli, ‘The Battlegrounds of European Identity’, European Societies, 2.2 
(2010), 113-137. On the Vatican’s campaign, see Marcin Frydrych, ‘Vatican regrets absence of Christianity in EU 
Constitution’, EUobserver, 21 June 2004. Available at: http://euobserver.com/institutional/16686 (accessed 22 
November 2012). 
10Claus Leggewie, Der Kampf um die europäische Erinnerung. Ein Schlachtfeld wird besichtigt (Munich, 2011), p. 185. 
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starting point for the exhibition’s chronology will be 1946, since the member states have difficulty 
in agreeing on how the Second World War in particular would be represented and interpreted.11 
 
That the Second World War should be pereceived as a sticking-point for such a project is 
symptomatic of the current state of memory politics in the EU. In parallel with the EU’s attempts to 
come to terms with its identity dilemma since the end of the Cold War, we have also seen the 
emergence of commemoration of the Second World War, and specifically of the genocide against 
Europe’s Jews, as a touchstone not just for European memory culture, but also for a globalized 
agenda of human rights and post-conflict justice. While Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider’s hope 
may not have been realised that the memory of the Holocaust would become the standard against 
which every state’s actions in respect of human rights would be judged by the international 
community,12 it is nevertheless the case that, at least in western Europe, the US and Australasia, the 
Holocaust, and the notion of genocide for which it provides the original definition, has now become 
a privileged analogy through which Western nations and their related public spheres think about and 
relate to both historical human rights abuses and contemporary crises. And this even if, as Peter 
Novick demonstrates, the invocation of Holocaust memory by no means guarantees appropriate 
humanitarian intervention in any particular case.13 
 
The early 2000s, as the EU moved closer to its expansion to the east, were marked by increased 
levels of activity among governments in the ‘old’ member states to cement the significance of 
Holocaust as a common European memory. For Cecile Felicia Stockholm Banke, these efforts can 
                                            
11Daily Mail, ‘Row Brewing as Cost of New Brussels History Museum Soars’. 6 April 2011. Available at: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/article-1373596/Brussels-House-Of-European-History-museum-Row-brewing-
escalating-costs.html#ixzz29l3V016t (accessed 19 October 2012). Judging by the recently published brochure for the 
project, however, the scope of exhibition is likely to reach back as far as the 19th century. European Parliament, Building 
a House of European History (Luxembourg, 2013) (Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/visiting/ressource/static/files/building-a-house-of-european-history_e-v.pdf (accessed 10 
February 2014). 
12Daniel Levy and Nathan Sznaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (Philadelphia, 2006). 
13Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (New York, 2000). 
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be directly linked to ‘the need for shared values within the EU’ as it faced enlargement.14 In many 
western European nations, the 1970s and 1980s had seen a reappraisal of old myths of national 
victimhood and resistance to National Socialism which had sustained those nations’ material and 
moral recovery after World War II.15 This process had not only been driven by political elites. 
Indeed, it had often involved activism by citizens to uncover and commemorate the extent of the 
nation’s complicity: as, for example, in the excavation of the former Gestapo headquarters in 
Berlin.16 Where politicians did seek to determine appropriate forms of commemoration, they often 
had to contend with the criticism of activists for not going far enough in their assumption of guilt, 
as in the debates around the Vel’ d’Hiv memorial in Paris.17 Even in the United Kingdom, whose 
territory had (largely) not been occupied, and whose population had therefore not been forced to 
choose between collaboration and resistance, issues such as the legitimacy of the campaigns of 
Bomber Command meant that the fight against Nazism was no longer simply a source of positive 
identification. At the same time, as the witnesses to the Holocaust became fewer in number, the 
need to preserve the memory of the Holocaust was perceived as increasingly pressing. Yet the task 
of preserving that memory fell not only to governments and activists, but was also taken up in 
highly effective ways by the mass media, from the American television series Holocaust (1979), 
which has been credited with opening up the debate about the genocide against Europe’s Jews both 
in Germany and further afield,18 to Hollywood productions such as Steven Spielberg’s Oscar-
winning Schindler’s List (1993), to name only one of the most prominent films on the subject. 
 
Drawing on this increased prominence of the Holocaust in the public sphere, European institutions 
implemented a series of measures throughout the 1990s in order to secure the status of the genocide 
                                            
14Cecile Felicia Stokholm Banke, The Legacies of the Holocaust and European Identity after 1989 (Copenhagen, 2009). 
Available at: http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/WP2009/WP2009-
36_Legacies_holocaust_european_identity_web.pdf (accessed 24 October 2012) 
15Emmanuel Droit, ‘Le Goulag contre le Shoah: Mémoires officielles et cultures mémorielles dans l’Europe élargie’, 
Vigntième Siècle. Revue d’histoire, 94 (2007), 101-120 (pp. 103-104); Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 
1945 (London, 2010), pp. 808-809. 
16Karen E. Till, The New Berlin: Memory, Politics, Place (Minneapolis, 2005), pp. 65-67. 
17Peter Carrier, Holocaust Monuments and National Memory. France and Germany since 1989  (Oxford, 2005), pp. 60-
67. 
18Judt, p. 811. 
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against Europe’s Jews as a cornerstone of European memory culture. In 1995, for example, the 
European Parliament proposed the institution of an EU-wide Holocaust Memorial Day. This project 
(later realised through UN Resolution 60/7 in 2005) was taken up by the Declaration of the 
Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust in 1998, a key intergovernmental initiative which 
led to the setting up of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, 
Remembrance, and Research. A nominally international, yet primarily European affair, the work of 
the Taskforce is premised on the status of the Holocaust as a unique historical event whose 
commemoration offers lessons for the future in terms of the global defence of human rights. In the 
words of the Stockholm Declaration: ‘the unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always 
hold universal meaning’. In this sense, the Stockholm Declaration draws on the now dominant 
paradigm of Holocaust scholarship, which starts from the premise of the genocide against Europe’s 
Jews as an ontologically unique event.19 There is, of course, a paradox here, in that the Holocaust is 
presented both as an event unlike any other, but also as the measure by which Europeans are called 
upon to respond to other events which echo, but can never be the same as, the Holocaust itself. This 
paradox became particularly acute during the accession processes which led to the expansion of the 
EU to the east in 2004. Post-communist nations which were themselves emerging from a long 
history of dictatorship were required to sign up to a Holocaust-centric EU memory agenda as proof 
of their democratic credentials, to the extent that Emmanuel Droit has spoken of the ‘Copenhagen 
memory criteria’ as a kind of moral adjunct to the formal criteria for EU accession.20 
 
The period since the 2004 enlargement has been marked, however, by attempts among the new, 
post-communist member states in eastern and central Europe to influence the EU’s memory agenda 
in favour of an anti-totalitarian memory, commemorating both victims of fascism and communism, 
as opposed to a memory which focuses only on the Holocaust and its moral legacy. The pressure 
                                            
19Jean-Michel Chaumont, Die Konkurrenz der Opfer. Genozid, Identität, Anerkennung (Lüneburg, 2001). 
20Droit, p. 103. Annabelle Littoz-Monnet has called acknowledgement of the primacy of Holocaust memory a ‘soft 
entry criterion’ for EU membership. Annabelle Littoz-Monnet, ‘The EU Politics of Remembrance: Can Europeans 
Remember Together?’, West European Politics, 35.5 (2012), 1182-1202 (p. 1182). 
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these states have brought to bear has not been without effect. For example, as a European 
Commission report to the Council and Parliament of 2010 documents,21 the EU’s collective 
statements of intent on memory issues have been marked in recent years by an emphasis on a shared 
history of conflict to be overcome and, as in the Stockholm Programme of December 2009, the 
shared values of the EU, ‘which are incompatible with crimes against humanity, genocide and war 
crimes, including crimes committed by totalitarian regimes’.22 
 
Post-communist EU member states have made use of a number of the Union’s institutions in order 
to promote this agenda. On 8 April 2008, the Slovene Presidency of the Council of the EU (January-
June 2008) organised a public hearing on crimes committed by ‘totalitarian regimes’ in cooperation 
with the Commission,  an initiative followed swiftly by a conference on the crimes of communism 
sponsored by the Senate of the Czech Republic. This conference led to the signing of the ‘Prague 
Declaration on European Conscience and Memory’, which demands that the communist regimes of 
Europe ‘must inform all European minds to the same extent as the Nazi regime’s crimes did.’ The 
declaration was signed by a variety of anti-communist historians, former dissidents, right-wing 
politicians and representatives of state-funded memorial initiatives. The conference and the 
declaration were something of a curtain-raiser to the Czech Presidency of the Council of the Union 
(January-June 2009), which, while widely condemned as shambolic, was notable for its push to 
restrain Russian influence in the newly expanded EU’s eastern neighbourhood.23 As I will discuss 
below, fear of Russian influence among some post-communist EU member states is a not 
insignificant factor in the pressure to establish memory of communist dictatorship on a par with that 
                                            
21European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: The Memory of 
the Crimes Committed by Totalitarian Regimes in Europe’ (Brussels, 2010). Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/reding/pdf/com(2010)_873_1_en_act_part1_v61.pdf ( accessed 31 October 
2012) 
22Council of the European Union, ‘The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting 
Citizens’, p. 3. Available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:115:0001:0038:en:PDF 
(accessed 30 October 2012). 
23Andrew Rettmann, ‘Czech Presidency Limps off the Stage,’ EU Observer, 30 June 2009. Available at: 
http://euobserver.com/political/28398 (accessed 25 October 2012). 
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of the National Socialism, with Russia’s apparent unwillingness to address the Stalinist past often 
linked to anti-democratic tendencies in the present. 
 
Under the Czech Presidency, a second public hearing was convened, on 18 March 2009, which 
concluded with a call for the establishment of a ‘Platform of European Memory and Conscience’ 
and the institution of a ‘Remembrance Day for  Victims of Nazism and Totalitarian Communism on 
23 August’.24 By the end of that month, the European Parliament had voted to accept a motion 
tabled by parliamentarians from a number of post-communist member states which made the same 
demands as the Czech Presidency’s hearing, and the European Day of Remembrance for Victims of 
Stalinism and Nazism was created. The day chosen for this commemoration, 23 August, is 
significant for the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the secret clauses of the Nazi-Soviet 
non-aggression treaty of 1939, which paved the way for the invasion and division of Poland by 
Germany and the Soviet Union. 2009 marked the seventieth anniversary of the pact, and was also 
the occasion of a conference organised under the auspices of the then President of the European 
Parliament, Polish MEP Jerzy Buzak, with the support of the Baltic states. Subsequently, the 
European Parliament has also played host to a conference on the Legal Settlement of Communist 
Crimes (June 2012), organised by the Platform of European Memory and Conscience. The 
Platform, called for at both the Czech Presidency’s public hearing and in the European Parliament 
motion of 2009, was finally founded in October 2011, although not as an EU project: its work – 
producing educational materials and touring exhibitions to spread understanding of the crimes of 
communism throughout Europe – is in fact sponsored directly by the V4 Group (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic) rather than by the EU itself.25 
 
                                            
24Czech Presidency of the Council of the European Union (2009) ‘European Conscience and Crimes of Totalitarian 
Communism.’ Available at: http://www.ustrcr.cz/data/pdf/tiskove_zpravy/slyseni-brusel-final-conclusions.pdf (accessed 
21 November 2012). 
25Further details available at http://www.memoryandconscience.eu/about-the-platfor (accessed 21 November 2012). 
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Despite this wealth of activity at the European level, I argue that the meanings of and motivations 
for this promotion of ‘anti-totalitarian’ memory by central and eastern European member states can 
only be properly be understood when the conditions at the national level are considered. In order to 
do so, I will now to turn to my case studies, beginning with the Baltic states.  
 
The Baltic States 
 
The position of the Baltic states as EU members is fundamentally conditioned by their historical 
experience of being caught between larger European powers, particularly Russia and Germany. 
After having briefly achieved independence from Russia in 1917, the Nazi-Soviet pact opened the 
way for their annexation by the Soviet Union. Briefly re-occupied by Germany during the Second 
World War, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia were subject to Sovietization in the post-war period and 
only re-gained their independence in the early 1990s. With sizeable Russian populations and a 
powerful neighbour, the Baltic states have turned to western alliances within the EU and NATO ‘as 
ultimate guarantors of national sovereignty’.26 In particular, in the wake of Baltic accession to the 
EU, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia have been disturbed to see Russia seeking to impose its influence 
on the EU’s eastern neighbourhood, especially given Russia’s move away from democracy and 
towards a more authoritarian style of politics under Putin. Russia’s desire for influence in central 
and eastern Europe is particularly a threat to the Baltic states’ energy policies, since they are reliant 
on Russian gas, yet have also been by-passed as a supply route for energy to the rest of Europe with 
the advent of the Nord Stream gas pipeline deal between Russia and Germany in 2005.27 With 
reference to the energy situation, this association of Russia’s Soviet past and the politics of Putin is 
made explicit by prominent Lithuanian conservative, and signatory of the Prague Declaration, 
Vytautas Landsbergis, speaking at the European Parliament’s conference on the seventieth 
                                            
26David Galbreath, ‘From Nationalism to Nation-Building: Latvian Politics and Minority Policy’, Nationalities Papers, 
34.4 (2006), 383-406 (p. 399). 
27Andres Kasekamp, A History of the Baltic States (Basingstoke, 2010), pp. 195-196. 
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anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact: ‘the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is not out of business. 
You may ask where one can see it. Look inside the mentality of mutant Soviet communism turned 
into nationalism of today with preferences of its representatives to subjugate neighbouring 
territories again and again [sic]’.28 
 
As Andres Kasekamp observes, it is the interpretation of history which has become ‘the central 
battleground between the Baltic states and Russia’.29 This serves three interconnected functions 
from the point of view of the Baltic states. Firstly, by stressing Russia’s hostile occupation of their 
countries and the suffering of their populations under Soviet rule, the Baltic states can present 
themselves as victims who deserve protection from the EU and other international organisations. 
Secondly, by accusing Russia of failing to come to terms adequately with the Stalinist past, a charge 
which is justified in many respects, it can underline the dangers of Russia power in the present. 
Implicitly, if Russia does not condemn communism and Stalin in particular in the present, it 
demonstrates that it may be willing to adopt a similar anti-democratic and imperialist stance, 
threatening the security of EU member states in central and eastern Europe. Thirdly, drawing 
attention to Russia’s misdeeds in the past and its current failures in coming to terms with its 
authoritarian past potentially provide a moral argument for the other EU states to support the Baltic 
states against Russia, given that the EU purports to defend democracy and human rights in the name 
of (anti-totalitarian) history. 
 
This anti-Russian rhetoric has been played out in a number of spectacular disputes between the 
Baltic states over their shared history. For example, in April of 2007, a diplomatic conflict erupted 
between the Estonian government and the Russian Federation after the removal of the ‘Bronze 
Soldier’, the Soviet-era Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn, from the centre of the Estonian 
                                            
28Vytautas Landsbergis, ‘Address of Professor Vytautas Landsbergis’, in Europe 70 Years after the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact, ed. by European Parliament (Vilnius, 2009), pp. 21-24 (p. 23). 
29Kasekamp, p. 196. 
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capital, along with the bodies of the unknown soldiers which flanked it. The monument was re-
erected in an out-of-town cemetery, and the bodies re-interred, but this relocation led to riots in the 
capital by Russians and Estonian Russian-speakers, as well as to a war of words with Russia itself, 
whose foreign minister described the removal as an act of ‘blasphemy’ against the memory of 
Soviet forces.30 For many Estonians, the Soviet memorial ‘symbolized their national tragedy’ and 
celebrated in the figure of a Soviet soldier ‘the organizer of deportations, a war criminal, a 
murderer’.31 However, it would be an over-simplification to present the debate over the statue as 
merely an expression of a unified Estonian desire for independence from Russian dominance. The 
controversy also had a domestic political dimension, in that it expressed a struggle for internal 
political dominance within Estonia itself, with parties of the Left, the Right and of the Russian 
minority taking up positions according to their own political agenda32 and attempting to make use 
of the conflict for their own ends. 
 
This overlapping and interaction of domestic political issues with international tensions in the field 
of memory politics is a phenomenon which Jennifer Lind has pointed to in the very different 
context of Sino-Japanese relations.33 Lind’s work reminds us that, when examining a nation’s 
pursuit of a particular memory agenda at the international level, we should bear in mind that this 
may also open up controversies in national politics. Conversely, as with Estonia’s relationship to the 
EU, we can see how such domestic issues can swiftly become a source of international tension, as 
when the European Parliament voted for a solidarity motion with Estonia in the wake of Russia’s 
criticism of the relocation of the ‘Bronze Soldier’ statue.34  
 
                                            
30James Mark, The Unfinished Revolution: Making Sense of the Communist Past in Central-Eastern Europe (Yale, 
2011), p. 117. 
31Marko Lehti, Matti Jutila and Markku Jokisipilä, ‘Never-Ending Second World War: Public Performances of National 
Dignity and the Drama of the Bronze Soldier’, Journal of Baltic Studies, 39.4 (2008), 393-418 (p. 398). 
32Mark, p. 117. 
33Jennifer Lind, Sorry States: Apologies in International Politics (Ithaca and London, 2008), pp. 26-100. 
34Leggewie, p. 61. 
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A further flashpoint in Baltic-Soviet relations was the film The Soviet Story (2008), directed by 
Latvian Edvīns Šnore and sponsored by the UEN Group in the European Parliament. Somewhat 
paradoxically, we see here a Eurosceptic, conservative nationalist grouping within the Parliament 
making use of a European platform to call upon the EU to defend the rights of small nations like the 
Baltic states against Russian power. It was UEN members from the Baltic states who were at the 
forefront of promoting and, in some cases, appearing in the film, which charts the crimes of 
National Socialism and Stalinism both domestically and at war, making arguments for the 
comparability, if not identity, of the two ideologies. What is most striking about the film, however, 
is that the last ten minutes are devoted to an attack on Russia under Putin. Contemporary film of 
fascist groups in the Soviet Union committing assaults and murders is cut together with criticism of 
the Putin regime’s promotion of a positive memory culture in relation to Stalin as the leader of the 
Great Patriotic War and Russia’s general authoritarian turn. The European Union is also criticised 
for failing to press Moscow to pursue those who committed human rights abuses in the GULag: a 
result, as French conservative historian and co-author of The Black Book of Communism (1997) 
Nicholas Werth claims in the film, of the EU’s dependence on Russian oil and gas. The voice-over 
of the film ends by informing readers that what characterised both Nazi and Stalinist ideology was a 
belief that some ‘inferior’ nations could be sacrificed in the name of progress, linking this 
commonality between fascism and communism to the EU’s allegedly conciliatory stance towards 
Russia. Here, implicitly, the Baltic nations are placed back in their victim role, caught between the 
interests of more powerful nations. 
 
The film was shown on Latvian state television in June of 2009 and was subsequently broadcast on 
Estonian state television to mark the memorial day of Juri Kukk, a political prisoner who died in 
Soviet detention.35 The reaction from nationalist groups in Russia included the burning of an effigy 
of the film’s director outside the Latvian embassy in Moscow and a threat by nationalist historian 
                                            
35Baltic News Service, ‘Representation of European Commission in Estonia to Show The Soviet Story’, 3 September 
2009. 
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and columnist Alexander Dyukov to kill the director with his own hands.36 Subsequently, Dyukov 
published a paper refuting alleged errors in the film’s presentation of the facts and dismissing it as a 
politicised attack by Latvia on Russia: ‘we shall not deny the fact of Soviet political repressions, a 
tragic chapter in our history. But we cannot agree with the outright lies of “The Soviet Story” – 
primarily because they are used by Latvian politicians to ignite hatred toward our country’.37 The 
Russian state news agency also condemned the film as inaccurate and as a propagandistic attack 
against Russia,38 while the Russian press contained speculation that this was merely ‘revenge’ for 
Russian state media’s ongoing emphasis on the legacy of fascism in the Baltic states, including the 
film The Baltic Nazism, which was shown on Russian television in 2007.39 However, criticism of 
the film was not only external to Latvia. Tatjana Ždanoka, who is a Latvian MEP of For Human 
Rights in United Latvia, a party representing the interests of the Russian-Latvian minority, 
described the film as a mouth-piece for right-wing Lativian politicians and their attacks on Russia.40 
 
The Soviet Story and ‘Bronze Soldier’ episodes demonstrate how the push for condemnation of the 
crimes of communism in the Baltic has both international and domestic dimensions. At the domestic 
level, such disputes are part of an on-going struggle between national majorities and Russian 
minorities. They are clearly also episodes which national-conservative and far-right parties can 
easily instrumentalise at the national level. At the international level, these conflicts over historical 
memory with Russia express mistrust on both sides and, particularly with the case of the Soviet 
Story, we can see how conservative-nationalist parties can make use of European institutions, in this 
case the Parliament, to draw the EU into these conflicts and press their case for greater support from 
Europe against Russian dominance. As David Galbreath and Ainius Lašas argue, this co-option of 
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the EU to the Baltic’s regional interests through the politicisation of history is not universally 
welcomed by other EU members, as it appears to stand in the way of developing cooperation with 
Russia without offering viable alternatives. In this sense, Galbreath and Lašas suggest, the Baltic 
state’s memory politics can put them in the position of being ‘policy spoilers rather than 
entrepreneurs’.41 The attempts on the part of the Baltic states, along with other central and eastern 
European states to put the crimes of communism on the EU’s memory agenda as a counterweight to 
the western emphasis on the Holocaust can also be seen as an expression of the split within the EU 
over relations with Russia, dividing those member states who hope for an integration of Russia both 
politically and economically from those who see Russian expansionism as a threat to democracy 
which must be contained.42 
 
Hungary 
 
Hungary provides a useful contrast to the situation in the Baltic states. Whereas, in the examples 
described above, participants in controversies over the commemoration of the communist past have 
sought to emphasise both its national and international dimensions, in the case of Hungary we find 
an example of the instrumentalisation of history in national politics which has only recently spilled 
over into the rhetoric of EU-Hungary relations. 
 
The leader of the national-conservative FIDESZ party, Victor Orbán, first came to power as Prime 
Minister in 1998-2002, but despite the poor economic record of his rivals, the ex-communist 
Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP), they were able to win elections in 2002 and again in 2006; even 
in spite of a scandal in which, before the 2006 election, the leader of the MSZP was recorded 
admitting he had lied about the state of the economy. As Anna Seleny points out, the MSZP’s 
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success in comparison with other ex-communist parties in east central Europe is evidenced by its 
being the only one to have won two consecutive terms in office. A key element of Orbán’s strategy 
to challenge MSZP dominance, she argues, has been to form alliances with smaller parties around a 
shared anti-communist agenda.43 
 
During his first term as Prime Minister, Orbán funded a museum at the ‘House of Terror’, a building 
formerly used as a prison by the security service of the Hungarian fascist Arrow Cross government, 
and subsequently by the secret police of the communist regime. Despite the avowed remit to 
represent both of these pasts, drawing parallels between them, critics have observed that the 
museum appears to focus disproportionately on communist crimes.44 As James Mark observes, the 
site was used by Orbán for making political speeches during the 2002 election campaign, and the 
Prime Minister even took advantage of the occasion of the opening ceremony to remark that the 
museum should be seen by Hungarians as a warning against the consequences of voting for the 
MSZP.45 Clearly, none of this helped Orbán win the election. What it does demonstrate, however, is 
that in Hungary, as opposed to the Baltic states, the mobilization of the communist past has been 
conditioned by the strength of the ex-communist MSZP, rather by than the country’s relationship 
with Russia on the one hand and the EU on the other. 
 
This constellation changed, however, with Orbán’s re-election in 2010, since which his government 
has been in a continued state of conflict with the EU. The MSZP’s handling of the economy led to a 
financial disaster and a bail-out by other members of the European Union in 2009. As Jan-Werner 
Müller notes, the MSZP, despite its socialist credentials, had become widely perceived by 
Hungarians as an agent of globalization and the corrupt representative of multinational 
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corporations.46 Orbán’s programme, by contrast, stresses national autonomy, particularly in 
economic matters, and the rhetoric of his memory politics is not merely anti-communist, but also 
draws upon other instances of outside interference in Hungarian affairs. For example, he has 
established a Trianon memorial day, commemorating the reduction of Hungarian territory by that 
treaty by foreign powers in 1920, and has introduced new citizenship rights for those Hungarians 
excluded from the national territory as a consequence.47 Nevertheless, Orbán has still been able to 
mobilise the memory of communism by stressing its significance as a form of outside interference 
in Hungarian affairs, a narrative which is already present in the House of Terror museum, where 
National Socialism is cast in a similar light.48 In this way, diverse historical events, including the 
Soviet invasion of 1956, are figured as instances of unwarranted foreign influence in Hungary’s 
national life. The controversial new constitution which Orbán’s government introduced in 2011 
made explicit reference to these ‘moral defeats of the twentieth century’,49 but has been perceived 
by the EU as incompatible with the Union’s democratic standards. This comes on the heels of a 
climb-down in the face of European pressure over Orbán’s restrictive media law of 2010, which 
had, for instance, attempted to criminalise journalists for ‘insulting’ by ‘publishing adverse opinions 
regarding persons,’ who were, one can infer, most likely to be ‘persons’ in power.50 It is worth 
noting that this reversal came at a time when Orbán’s government was reliant on EU support to help 
it weather the effects of the global financial crisis. Subsequently, however, Hungary has been able to 
manage without  further EU loans,51 which has left Orbán in a stronger position to  push through his 
constitution in March 2013,  without regard to the  Commission’s opposition to the measures 
deemed to curtail civil liberties and weaken the constitutional court.  Speaking in March of 2012, at 
a ceremony marking the Hungarian uprising against Habsburg rule in 1848, Orbán drew parallels 
                                            
46Jan-Werner Müller, ‘The Hungarian Tragedy,’ Dissent, 58.2 (2011), 5-10 (pp. 5-6). 
47Ibid., p. 7. 
48Jones, p. 104. 
49Quoted in Laura Ymayo Tartakoff, ‘Religion, Nationalism, History, and Politics in Hungary’s New Constitution’, 
Global Society, 49 (2012), 360–366 (p. 362). 
50Presseurop, ‘Budapest Folds on Controversial Media Law.’ 17 February 2011. Available at: 
http://www.presseurop.eu/en/content/news-brief/506461-budapest-folds-controversial-media-law (accessed: 12 October 
2012). 
51 European Commission, ‘Balance-of-payments Assistance to Hungary’. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/hungary/index_en.htm (accessed: 11 February 2014). 
18 
 
between that form of nineteenth century foreign rule, the Nazi and Soviet occupations, and the 
present behaviour of the EU: 
 
We are more than familiar with the character of unsolicited comradely assistance, even if it 
comes wearing a finely tailored suit and not a uniform with shoulder patches. […] 
Hungarians will not live as foreigners dictate, will not give up their independence or their 
freedom, therefore they will not give up their constitution either.52 
 
What is striking about the role of the communist past in Orbán’s very popular politics, I would 
argue, is that what began as a means of discrediting a powerful political rival and bringing together 
opposition political parties in a bid to challenge that rival has become, at a time of economic crisis 
for Hungary, a means by which the Prime Minister can present himself in a tradition of Hungarian 
freedom-fighters, standing up to foreign influence. Whereas there are points of comparison with the 
situation in the Baltic countries, it is notable that it is not contemporary Russia which serves as the 
bogey-man here, but rather the same EU which the Baltic states call upon to defend their 
independence. 
 
Germany 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany is clearly far from being typical of the pre-2004 EU member 
states of Western Europe, at least as far its memory politics are concerned. Not only was Germany 
the country where the Holocaust originated (even if some of its greatest crimes were committed in 
other countries), it is the only ‘old’ EU member state to incorporate territory from the former Soviet 
bloc: in a very real sense, the first post-Cold War enlargement of the EU took place in Germany, 
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when the five new Länder which had previously made up the German Democratic Republic joined 
the Federal Republic in October 1990. From the early 1990s, the German state has sought to ‘come 
to terms’ with the socialist dictatorship in East Germany by funding parliamentary enquiries, 
museums, educational programmes, compensation schemes and a historical foundation.53 
Nevertheless, it is significant that this process ran in parallel with an even greater public 
engagement with the National Socialist past, exemplified not least by the building of a large 
‘Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe’ at the heart of the re-built capital city of Berlin. 
Equally, and despite the best efforts of some conservative politicians and former East German 
dissidents, German memory policy has been at pains not to put the suffering of the victims of the 
Soviet occupation until 1949 and of the GDR regime until 1989 on the same footing as those of the 
Jews under National Socialism. Despite the official designation of the GDR as ‘the second German 
dictatorship’, Germany’s current ‘Federal Memorial Concept’, the closest thing Germany has to a 
set of national guidelines for dealing with its own history, clearly attributes to the Holocaust an 
‘incomparability’ which sets it apart from and above the suffering of those persecuted by the GDR 
regime.54 German memory policy walks a tight-rope between the desire not to let the crimes of 
communism appear insignificant in relation to the Holocaust and the fear that the necessary 
emphasis on such crimes may diminish the unique status of the atrocities committed by National 
Socialism: 
 
All remembrance of the history of dictatorships in Germany must start from the position that 
one may neither relativize the crimes of National Socialism nor trivialise the injustice 
perpetrated by the East German dictatorship.55 
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This careful compromise is, I would argue, the result of the coming together of both domestic and 
external factors. Firstly, the recognition of and coming to terms with the crimes of National 
Socialism, as well as the demonstration of contrition on the part of the Federal Republic, have been 
a key factor in Germany’s attempt to regain trust among its neighbours, from the Ostpolitik of Willy 
Brandt to an explosion in commemoration and memorialisation in the wake of German unification. 
Despite some attempts by conservatives to challenge the dominance of German guilt, by the end of 
the 1980s, a cross-party consensus had been achieved based on a hegemonic ‘culture of 
contrition’.56 In the wake of German unification, Chancellor Helmut Kohl continued to reassure 
European neighbours, and German voters, that Germany’s integration in a newly widened and 
deepened Europe Union was the only way to prevent a return to Germany’s pre-1945 Sonderweg.57 
Secondly, however, perhaps the key political surprise of the post-unification period has been the 
resurgence of the ex-communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS; now renamed DIE LINKE), 
which was able to form coalition governments with the Social Democrats in several eastern states 
after unification and was even part of a red-red municipal coalition in Berlin from 2002 to 2011. 
Coupled with an ongoing sense of post-communist nostalgia for the good old days of full 
employment and a strong welfare state in the economically troubled eastern Länder, many 
conservatives feared that socialism might be making a comeback. In practical electoral terms, the 
rise of a fourth viable coalition party threatened to deprive the Christian Democrats of their 
traditional advantage in Germany’s political system.58 By emphasising links between the PDS/DIE 
LINKE and communist crimes, Christian Democrats and their supporters among former dissidents 
and victims of the regime have simultaneously sought to discredit left-wing politics more generally. 
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Nevertheless, these domestic political struggles have barely spilled over into Germany’s approach 
to memory politics at the European level, even though Christian Democrats have led five of the 
seven national coalitions since German unification. Representatives of state-funded organisations 
which deal with the legacy of East German socialism are certainly active in European initiatives for 
preserving the memory of communism, such as the Platform of European Memory and Conscience 
and the Prague Declaration. However, this has had little effect on Germany’s prioritization of 
Holocaust memory in the EU context. For example, a key measure put forward by the German 
Presidency of the Council of the EU in 2007 was the proposal of a Framework Decision which 
aimed to criminalise the denial of genocide and racially motivated war crimes across the Union,59 
echoing Germany’s own prohibition on Holocaust denial. Finally adopted in 2008, it re-reproduced 
the hierarchy of Holocaust memory over memory of communism which is key to the German 
context: 
 
The Framework Decision deals with such crimes as incitement to hatred and violence and publicly 
condoning, denying or grossly trivializing crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. The Framework Decision is limited to crimes committed on the grounds of race, colour, 
religion, descent and national or ethnic origin. It does not cover crimes committed on other grounds 
for example by totalitarian regimes. However, the Council deplores all of these crimes.60 
 
Consequently, and not only in the sense that the German model of ‘coming to terms with the past’ 
has been exported to other countries in Europe and beyond,61 we can fairly speak of a 
Germanization of European memory politics. While Germany has invested significant resources in 
dealing with the East German past since 1990 in the domestic context, this has not lead to a 
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modification of Germany’s stance at the EU level. Clearly, Germany is reluctant to appear to be 
moving away from a Holocaust-centred memory culture when dealing with its European partners. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As I have shown with my three examples, it is something of an over-simplification to claim that 
‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe are pitted against each other over the EU’s memory politics along clearly 
drawn east-west battle-lines. All of the central and eastern European EU member states have 
certainly been supportive of a push for greater recognition of the crimes of communism at the EU 
level, but the differences in the meaning and function of that memory in domestic politics of 
individual central and eastern European member states suggest that this apparently united front can 
obscure the fundamentally national frame of memory politics. This anchoring of memory debates in 
the specificities of national politics, which Melissa Nobles has observed, for example, in the rather 
different context of apologies to indigenous minorities in post-colonial states,62 does not mean, 
however, that the European level becomes irrelevant. What is striking about the examples discussed 
above is that the shifting of memory debates from the domestic and into the European sphere 
changes the stakes of those debates. Broadly speaking, however intrinsic such debates may be to 
domestic political struggles, once governments or even individual politicians seek to bring these 
topics into the EU-level political discussion, they inevitably become issues of international 
relations, that is to say issues of relevance to the power relations between states. This is not to say 
that the desire to promote remembrance at the EU level cannot also be driven by a desire for 
domestic influence back home, potentially bolstered by the endorsement of one’s agenda by EU 
institutions. However, by bringing their memory agenda into EU institutions, politicians and 
governments allow that agenda to gain a new life as a matter of international relations. The negative 
case of my three, Germany, also demonstrates this point: it is precisely because the Germans do not 
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want to modify their relations with other EU member states and would like to improve relations 
with Russia that they choose to keep debates over the communist past in East Germany within the 
realm of domestic politics. 
 
Having said this, there are also apparently limits to the EU’s integration of the memory of 
communist crimes into its memory politics. Even the resolution adopted by the European 
Parliament to commemorate the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, which called for an 
incorporation of Soviet totalitarianism into European memory, was at pains to retain a special status 
for the crimes of National Socialism.63 This prioritization is equally evident in the Commission’s 
report of 2010 on ‘the memory of crimes committed by totalitarian regimes in Europe.’ While 
emphasising that there can be no ‘one-size-fits-all model’,64 the document notes that there is 
insufficient consensus on the issue of extending the Framework Decision of 2007/8 in order to 
include denial of crimes committed for political as opposed to racial reasons. The EU’s Stockholm 
Programme of December 2009, already quoted above, achieves a similar inclusion and 
hierarchisation by placing ‘crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes’, 
vocabulary traditional associated with and indeed having their origins in the attempts to deal with 
the legacy of National Socialism, before ‘crimes committed by totalitarian regimes’ in its list of the 
sources of the EU’s shared values; this before admitting that ‘[e]ach member state has its own 
approach to this issue’.65 
 
Although not explicitly stated as such, I would argue that what this amounts to is an official 
memory politics within the EU which allows for the expression of different national priorities in 
dealing with difficult pasts, stepping back somewhat from the pressure to prioritise Holocaust-
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centred memory as a pre-requisite of membership. At the same time, however, there remains an 
implicit prioritization of Holocaust memory in the Union’s stance. 
 
As Tony Judt has pointed out, the western European experience of and relationship to communism 
before 1990 was of a different kind to that found in central and eastern Europe.66 In addition, and 
despite attempts by some conservatives to utilise the memory of communism against the western 
European Left since 1990, it is the memory of the Holocaust as established in the 1970s and 1980s 
which has come to play a central role in the national memory politics of these western nations. For 
them, there is simply no need for, and certainly little domestic political capital to be extracted from 
an engagement with the crimes of the communist regimes of central and eastern Europe, or even 
with the legacies of (now largely defunct) communist parties at home. Furthermore, the ‘old’ 
member states largely do not see foreign policy advantages in promoting the memory of 
communism in the way that some of the ‘new’ member states and their politicians do. There 
therefore seems to be little prospect that official acknowledgement of the importance of 
communism for European history will translate into genuine engagement with that history in 
western Europe. What all of this means, ultimately, is that any EU memory politics, however 
inclusively formulated, will remain the vehicle of national interests, and that the divergence of these 
national concerns will continue to militate against any further harmonisation at the European level. 
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